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Private Monitoring and Communication in Cartels:
Explaining Recent Collusive Practices†
By Joseph E. Harrington and Andrzej Skrzypacz*
Motivated by recent cartel practices, a stable collusive agreement is
characterized when firms’ prices and quantities are private information. Conditions are derived whereby an equilibrium exists in which
firms truthfully report their sales and then make transfers within the
cartel based on these reports. The properties of this equilibrium fit
well with the cartel agreements in a number of markets including citric acid, lysine, and vitamins. (JEL D43, D82, K21, L12, L61, L65)
Cartel enforcement has been an active area of antitrust policy in recent years in the
United States, European Union, and many other parts of the world. The objective of
this paper is to use some of what we’ve recently learned about collusive practices
to better understand how and when cartels are able to operate effectively.1 Towards
that end, we identify common features of recent cartel agreements and construct an
equilibrium of a repeated game with private monitoring that matches some key features of those agreements. We begin by offering a few brief case studies to describe a
common environment faced by cartels and then describe the common way in which
they’ve structured the collusive mechanism. This serves to lay out the facts that we
seek to explain.
Lysine is added to livestock feed to develop body tissue in pigs and poultry.
In the early 1990s, the five major lysine producers formed a global cartel which
lasted until mid-1995. Though two of the firms—Ajinomoto and Sewon—recommended colluding through the allocation of exclusive geographic markets, Archer
Daniel Midlands (ADM) pushed for and succeeded in having accepted a sales quota
scheme whereby each firm was entitled to a certain level of output. The agreed-upon
allocation for 1992 for the global and European markets is shown in Table 1.2 Cartel
* Harrington: Department of Economics, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD 21218-2685 (e-mail: joe.
harrington@jhu.edu); Skrzypacz: Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305-5015
(e-mail: andy@gsb.stanford.edu). We appreciate the comments of three anonymous referees, Susan Athey, Jimmy
Chan, William Fuchs, Dino Gerardi, Johannes Hörner, and participants at the Bates White Antitrust Conference
(2008), UBC Summer Conference on Industrial Organization (2008), University of East Anglia–Centre for
Competition Policy Conference (2009), and Duke-Northwestern-Texas IO Theory Conference (2009), and at seminars at Cornell University, the European Commission, Michigan State University, and Yale University. The support
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To view additional materials, visit the article page at
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1
Information about recent cartels can be found in John M. Connor (2001), Margaret C. Levenstein and Valerie
Y. Suslow (2004), Harrington (2006), and Levenstein and Suslow (2006).
2
Unless otherwise noted, all ensuing facts are from European Commission decisions and can be found in
Harrington (2006).
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Table 1—Lysine Market Allocation (1992, tons)
Company
Ajinomoto
Archer Daniels Midland
Kyowa
Sewon
Cheil

Global
73,500
48,000
37,000
20,500
6,000

Europe
34,000
5,000
8,000
13,500
5,000

Source: Official Journal of the European Union, L 152/24, 7.6.2001, Case COMP/36.545/F3.

members also coordinated on price. For example, in a cartel meeting in July 1992, it
was agreed to raise the price to $1.05/lb by September 30, 1992, and to raise it again
to $1.20/lb by December 30, 1992.3
To monitor compliance, Kanji Mimoto of Ajinomoto was assigned the task of
preparing monthly “scorecards” for the cartel. Each company telephoned or mailed
their sales volumes to Mimoto, who then prepared a spreadsheet that was distributed at the quarterly meetings of the cartel. To promote compliance, “guaranteed
buy-ins” were used: a company that sold more than its quota had to buy output from
producers who were below quota.
There were isolated reports of cartel members underreporting their sales in order
to avoid the punishment associated with guaranteed buy-ins. For example, Cheil
claimed to the European Commission that it provided “misleading” sales information to the other companies, while Ajinomoto hid 3,500 tons of lysine from the
cartel’s auditors. An internal memo read: “Hide 1,000 tons in Thailand internal business.” Nevertheless, the collusive agreement was largely successful.
Citric acid is primarily used in the food and beverage industry, but is also an
ingredient in household cleaning products, pharmaceuticals, and cosmetics, as well
as having some industrial uses. From early 1991 to mid-1995, the five largest producers of citric acid operated a cartel. At the time, they made up about 60 percent
of global production and 67 percent of production in the European Union. A sales
quota scheme was established in terms of market shares. Reported in Table 2, these
market shares were based on the average of the previous three years’ sales.
As with the lysine cartel, the market allocation was monitored through the reporting of sales. On a monthly basis, each company reported its sales to an executive
of Hoffmann LaRoche. The data were then assembled and reported back to the
members by telephone. To provide some external validity, the reported sales were
checked by independent Swiss auditors. Enforcement was through a “buy-back system” whereby a company that exceeded its assigned quota in any one year was
obliged to purchase product from the companies with sales below their quota in the
following year. For example, at a cartel meeting in November 1991, it was determined that Haarmann and Reimer needed to buy 7,000 tons of citric acid from ADM
and it seemed the purchase was later made. In terms of efficacy, actual production by
each member adhered very closely to the cartel’s planned production.
There are a number of properties common to the citric acid and lysine cartels
that we would like to highlight. First note that demand in these markets came from
3
Official Journal of the European Communities, L 152/24, 7.6.2001, Case COMP/36.545/F3—Amino Acids,
Decision of 7 June 2000; paragraph 77.
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Table 2—Citric Acid Market Allocation (1991)
Company
Haarman and Reimer
Archer Daniels Midland
Jungbunzlauer
Hoffman LaRoche
Cerestar Bioproducts

Market share (percent)
32.0
26.3
23.0
13.7
5.0

Source: Official Journal of the European Union, L 239/18, 6.9.2002,
Case COMP/E-1/36.604.

industrial buyers, with price typically being set bilaterally between a seller and a
buyer. This meant that price, along with firm sales, were not public information.
Second, the collusive agreement was in terms of an allocation of sales, and not just
coordination on a common price. Third, the collusive agreement was monitored by
comparing sales to the agreed-upon quotas. Fourth, monitoring used self-reported
sales which, on the whole, were not verifiable. Fifth, the collusive agreement was (at
least partly) enforced through a transfer scheme whereby firms that reported sales
above their quota effectively made a payment (through interfirm purchases) to those
firms that reported sales below their quota.
These properties are not unique to the citric acid and lysine cartels. The setting of
sales quotas with monitoring in terms of reported sales was also a practice deployed
by cartels in the markets for carbonless paper, choline chloride, copper plumbing
tubes, graphite electrodes, plasterboard, vitamins, and zinc phosphate. For example,
from the European Commission decision on the vitamins cartel: “The purpose of
the quarterly meetings was to monitor achieved market shares against quota and to
adjust sales levels to comply with the agreed allocations.” 4
The accuracy of reported sales was established ex post for the carbonless paper
cartel: “Comparison of these figures with information on real sales figures confirms
that the sales volume information exchanged at the meeting was accurate.”5 Finally,
the use of a transfer scheme based upon reported sales was also documented for
cartels in choline chloride, organic peroxides, sodium gluconate, sorbates, vitamins,
and zinc phosphate. For example, for the choline chloride cartel “… it was understood that Akzo Nobel and UCB could claim 35 percent and 28 percent respectively,
while BASF would have 15 percent. The principle was accepted that compensation
should be provided if these shares were exceeded.”6
In fact, these collusive practices are not a recent phenomenon, as they were present in the International Steel Agreement of 1926. Sales quotas were fixed according to Articles 3 and 4 and resulted in the allocation in Table 3. Article 5 specified
that monitoring would be in terms of sales: “Every month each country’s actual
net production of crude steel during that month shall be ascertained, in relation to
the figures indicated by the quotas.” And in Articles 6 and 7, penalties were specified in terms of monetary transfers between firms: “If the quarterly production of a
country exceeds the quota which was fixed for it, that country shall pay in respect
4
5
6

Quoting from the European Commission decision for the vitamin B2 cartel (Harrington 2006, p. 47).
Quoting from the European Commission decision for the carbonless paper cartel (Harrington 2006, p. 51).
Quoting from the European Commission decision for the choline chloride cartel (Harrington 2006, p. 58).
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Table 3—International Steel Agreement (1926)
Country
Germany
France
Belgium
Luxemburg
Saar Territory

Allocated market share (percent)
40.45
31.89
12.57
8.55
6.54

Source: Alfred Plummer (1938).

of each ton in excess a fine of 4 dollars, which shall accrue to the common fund… .
If the production of any country has been below the quota allotted to it, that country
shall receive in compensation from the common fund the sum of two dollars per ton
short.” Thus, the collusive practices observed in more recent years have been in use
for at least 80 years.
What the preceding summary of cartels reveals is that, when faced with colluding in an environment in which prices and quantities are not easily observed, firms
responded with a similar design to their collusive agreement. Toward better understanding hard-core cartels, the primary objective of our research is to explain how
these well-documented collusive practices were effective in sustaining collusion.
What prevents firms from undercutting the collusive price and then underreporting their sales? How can cartel members be induced to truthfully report their sales
when higher sales reports require providing compensation to other members? We
show that, if market demand is not too volatile, an equilibrium exists in which firms
truthfully report their sales and set collusive prices, with asymmetric punishments
that could be implemented using guaranteed buy-ins or buy-backs. Thus, observed
collusive practices fit quite well within the equilibrium framework.
Our informational setting—in which the history of actions is private information
and players engage in costless communication—is not new to the repeated game literature, and various folk theorems have been derived.7 While the oligopoly game we
examine is not a member of the class of games considered in those papers, the more
crucial distinction lies in objectives. The focus of previous work on private monitoring is to characterize the set of equilibrium payoffs. In contrast, we want to explain
observed collusive agreements by constructing an empirically valid equilibrium that
sustains collusion when firms do not publicly observe prices or quantities.
The model is described in Section I and, as a benchmark, the static Nash equilibrium is characterized in Section II. The main result is in Section III, where we show
that, under certain demand conditions, collusion can be sustained when prices and
sales are private information using a strategy profile consistent with observed cartel
practices. Section IV discusses some limitations to the analysis and poses several
open questions to be addressed in future research. Section V concludes.

Research includes Olivier Compte (1998), Michihiro Kandori and Hitoshi Matsushima (1998), Masaki Aoyagi
(2002), Bingyong Zheng (2008), and Ichiro Obara (2009). For reviews of some of this literature, see Kandori
(2002) and George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson (2006). A separate line of related work explores contracting when a principal privately observes workers’ performance; see Jonathan Levin (2003), W. Bentley MacLeod
(2003), William Fuchs (2007), and a discussion in the online Appendix.
7
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I. Model

There are n ≥ 2 firms which, in each period of an infinite horizon setting, simultaneously choose price from a compact set, after which each firm’s sales are stochastically determined. (As is typical, it is assumed that a firm supplies to meet
demand.) The stochastic realization for period t is composed of total demand,
mt, and an allocation of that demand described by a vector of firms’ quantities, q_ t,
both of which are i.i.d. over time. Market demand is integer-valued and lies in the
_
_
_
_
m+ 1, … , m− 1, m  }, where 0 ≤ m
m is finite. Let
finite set Γ ≡ { m
_, _
_< m and 
ρ : Γ → [0, 1] be a probability function, where ρ(m) is the probability that the total
demand is m. Define
_


m

∑  ρ(m)m
μ ≡ 
m=_
m

as the average market sales. Note that market demand does not depend on firms’
prices. While firm demand will be sensitive to price, market demand is perfectly
inelastic.8 Firms have a common constant marginal cost of c.
_
_
An individual firm’s demand has support { 0, 1, …, q  }, where q is finite and, of
_ _
course, q≤ m. (Assuming the lower bound to firm sales/quantity is zero is not imporp) denote the probability that the quantity vector is _
q
 = {q1, …, qn},
tant.) Let Ψ(q
_; m, _
given price vector p
_= { p1, … , pn} and market demand m. To focus on symmetric equilibria, we assume that the probability distribution Ψ of how the market
demand is split is symmetric across the firms (i.e., it is invariant to permutations
of firm identities):
p) = Ψ(ω (q
p; i, j )) ∀ i, j, ∀ (q
q; i, j ) is the
A1 Ψ(q
_; m, _
_; i, j ); m, ω ( _
_, p
_), where ω(_
vector _
q
 when elements i and j are exchanged.

p) be the probability function on firm i ’s sales given total demand m
Next let ψ
 i  (q; m, _
 i( ⋅ ; q, _
p) denote firm
and the price vector _
p
 (ψi is a marginal distribution of Ψ). Let σ
i ’s beliefs on total sales given it sells q units and the price vector _
p. By Bayes’s rule,

ρ(m)ψi   (q; m, _
p)
_
	
σi  (m; q, _
p) =  __
  
   
  .

m
∑ m  ′=m_  ρ(m′ )ψi   (q; m′, _
p)

Two conditions are required of σi  (which implicitly places conditions on ρ and ψi).
A2 specifies that a firm always assigns positive probability to demand equalling its
maximum value, which is weaker than assuming σ
 i   has full support. A3 assumes

8
One can interpret the assumption that demand is inelastic not literally, but rather that there exists a choke price
_
_
_
psuch that for p ≤ pthe demand is inelastic and for p > pit is zero, where p
 represents the price of an alternative
input or the price at an alternative source in case of geographically concentrated cartels. With this interpretation our
_
results hold for prices below p. While we make this assumption for purposes of tractability, it is plausible for many
of the markets mentioned in the introduction, including choline chloride, citric acid, and vitamins. We elaborate on
this point in Section IV.

_
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that the higher a firm’s quantity, the more weight the firm attaches to total demand
being higher:9
_

A2 σi  (m; q, _
p) > 0, ∀ q, ∀ _
p.

p) first-order stochastically dominates (FOSD) σ
 i  (⋅ ; q″, p
A3 If q′ > q″, then σi  ( ⋅ ; q′, _
_),
.

∀ q′, q″, ∀ p
_
The setting is an infinitely repeated game in which, in each period, firms choose
price and then stochastic demand is realized. Let δ be the common discount factor
and assume a firm acts to maximize the expected present value of its profit stream.
Each firm’s price and realized sales are private information. This structure is augmented by allowing firms to make public messages and conduct monetary transfers.
The sequence of decisions and events is described below.
Stage 1 (price): Each firm chooses a nonnegative price.
Stage 2 (sales): With prices being private information, each firm learns its sales.
Sales 3 (report): With prices and sales being private information, firms simultane_
ously submit publicly observed costless messages from the set { ∅, 0, 1, … , q  },
where ∅ means providing no message. (A message is to be interpreted as a sales
report).10
Sales 4 (transfer): With prices and quantities being private information and reports
being public information, each firm makes a publicly observed nonnegative payment which is divided equally among the other n − 1 firms.
To place this model in perspective, the problem we are tackling is one of collusion
with imperfect monitoring, which originated with George J. Stigler (1964) and was
first formally treated in a game-theoretic setting by Edward J. Green and Robert H.
Porter (1984). With the latter treatment, which has become the standard approach,
firms choose quantities in a homogeneous goods industry with price being determined by those quantities and an unobserved demand shock. Firms’ quantities are
private information, while price is a public signal. In contrast, we assume both prices
and quantities are private information in the context of a price-setting game. Most
closely related is an earlier work by Harrington and Skrzypacz (2007), from which
the current paper differs in three ways. First, firms’ quantities are private information, which is at the heart of the problem we’re addressing here. Second, market
demand is stochastic, which is empirically compelling and required to make the
problem interesting (this is explained in Section III). Third, each firm sets a single
9
A2 and A3 hold, for example, when Ψ is derived from a binomial distribution; that is, each of m customers
independently chooses from which firm to buy. A proof is available from the authors upon request.
10
This specification modestly departs from actual cartel practices. For example, the citric acid cartel had Haarman
and Reimer, ADM, Jungbunzlauer, and Cerestar simultaneously submit sales reports to Hoffman LaRoche, after
which Hoffman LaRoche added its sales report and then disseminated all of the reports. This meant that Hoffman
LaRoche submitted its sales report after learning the reports of the other four cartel members.
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price for all customers instead of a customer-specific price. This third assumption
appears to be more for convenience, and we argue later that our results are likely to
be robust to it.
Finally, let us mention some other work that explores collusion for similar environments. Robert C. Marshall and Leslie M. Marx (2008) also consider a setting
in which prices and sales are private information but assume that any deviation
in price is perfectly identified from firms’ market shares. In contrast, we assume
market shares are subject to shocks and thus there is imperfect monitoring, which
is central to our equilibrium theory of collusive behavior. In comparison to Susan
Athey and Kyle Bagwell (2001, 2008), in our model prices are private and firms
report sales, while in their model actions are public but firms have private cost
shocks that they report to the cartel. The similarity is that in both models firms
compete in prices; the difference is in the source of the incentive problem. Athey
and Bagwell (2001, 2008) need to create incentives for firms to truthfully share
cost information in order to achieve greater joint profits by giving more market
share to the firm with lower cost, while in our setting there need to be incentives for
firms to truthfully share sales information in order to monitor compliance, thereby
providing proper pricing incentives. Finally, a recent paper by Jimmy Chan and
Wenzhang Zhang (2009) builds on our work by designing a novel and quite different collusive scheme.
II. Static Nash Equilibrium

Before considering the infinitely repeated setting, let’s establish the noncollusive
benchmark. Firm i ’s expected profit is
_


m

m

m=_
m

q=0

p).
	
πi  (p1, … , pn) = ∑  ρ(m)( pi − c) ∑   q  ψi  (q; m, _
Let pN(c) denote a symmetric Nash equilibrium:
_


m

m

m=_
m

q=0

	p  (c) ∈ arg max
  ∑
  ρ(m)( p − c) ∑  q  ψi  (q; m,  p,  pN, … , pN ).
p
N

We will assume the demand structure allows for a symmetric Nash equilibrium for
the static game, as specified in Assumption A4:
A4 The static game with cost c has, ∀ c ≥ 0, a symmetric Nash equilibrium price
pN(c) that is increasing, continuous, and unbounded in c.
p) depends only on pairA sufficient condition for A4 to hold is that: (i) ψ
 i   (q; m, _
wise price differences, which can be derived from a model of consumer choice with
quasi-linear preferences in money; (ii) the first-order condition (FOC) is sufficient
p) is interior for any equito characterize equilibrium for any cost; and (iii) ψ
 i  (q; m, _
librium prices. Indeed, as we show in the online Appendix, under these conditions a
firm’s equilibrium price equals its cost plus a constant, which satisfies A4.
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III. Sustaining Collusive Outcomes

Before moving on to the main result, let us first note that sustaining collusion
is trivial when market demand is common knowledge, either because it is fixed or
is stochastic but observed. Suppose it is common knowledge that market demand is
m′. If firm i expects the other firms to make truthful sales reports, then firm i knows
that if its report is inaccurate total reported sales will differ from m′. Although the
other firms will not know who delivered a misleading sales report, it will be common
knowledge among them that someone did. Thus, if there is a (common) punishment
when total reported sales differ from m′, firms can be induced to report truthfully if
they are sufficiently patient. Once firms are motivated to report truthfully, the collusive scheme presented in Harrington and Skrzypacz (2007) can sustain collusion.11
We then assume market demand is stochastic and unobserved.
Consider a symmetric strategy profile in which there are two phases: collusive
and noncollusive. Suppose the industry is in the collusive phase in period t. During
the price stage, the strategy has a firm set the collusive price. After firm i learns its
  it then truthfully reports those sales. If all firms have submitted
sales—denoted q  ti—
reports, then firm i pays zr  ti  to the other firms, where r  ti  was the firm’s sales report
in the previous stage (in equilibrium, r  ti  = q  ti  ). If all firms make their payments,
then there is a public randomization device which determines whether the industry
remains in the collusive phase or shifts to the noncollusive phase. The probability
function for shifting to the noncollusive phase is denoted ϕ : { 0, 1, 2, … } → [0, 1]; its
argument is the sum of firms’ sales reports. If a firm does not submit a report or failed
to make the appropriate payment, then the industry shifts to the noncollusive phase.
Once an industry is in the noncollusive phase, firms price according to the static Nash
equilibrium, don’t make reports, and don’t make payments. We refer to this strategy
profile as the lysine strategy profile and it is summarized below for firm i:
• In the price stage:
		

— if in the collusive phase then price at p
  ;

		

— if in the noncollusive phase then price at p N .

• In the report stage:
		

— if in the collusive phase then report r   ti  = q  ti; 

		

— if in the noncollusive phase then do not report.

• In the transfer stage:
		

11

— if in the collusive phase,

This collusive scheme is described in the proof of Theorem 1.
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* and all firms reported, where (r  t1,  … , r  tn)  is the vector of reports,
then make a payment of r  ti   z (which is then equally divided among
the other n − 1 firms);
* and one or more firms did not report then make a zero payment.
		

— if in the noncollusive phase then make a zero payment.

• In the transition stage (public randomization device):
		

— if in the collusive phase,
* all firms reported and x  tj  = r  tj   z ∀ j (where x  tj  is firm j ’s payment), then firms remain in the collusive phase with probability
n
1 − ϕ( ∑ j=1 r  tj   ) and shift to the noncollusive phase with probability ϕ( ∑ j=1 r  tj)  ;
n

* otherwise, firms go to the noncollusive phase with probability one.
		 — if in the noncollusive phase then firms remain in the noncollusive phase
		  with probability one.
The lysine strategy profile fits reasonably well with recent collusive practices in
markets such as citric acid, lysine, and vitamins. For when firms’ prices and quantities are private information—an appropriate feature of those markets—the cartel monitors the agreement by having firms report their sales, and then punish for
reported overproduction by having monetary transfers move from overproducers to
underproducers. In practice, these transfers were performed through interfirm sales
which, as long as price exceeds cost, act like monetary transfers. (Unfortunately,
we lack documentation regarding the price of interfirm sales.) A desirable feature
of performing transfers in this manner is that they did not create suspicion since
interfirm sales were a common competitive feature of these markets. The one feature
of the lysine strategy profile that is not expressly referred to in the documentation
of these cases is the conditions under which the cartel collapses. The lysine strategy
profile specifies that the probability of collusion stopping depends on firms’ sales
reports, as well as whether the requisite payments were made. In practice, evidence
is scarce that such contingencies are expressly discussed by cartel members; even
the 1926 International Steel Agreement did not specify in the contract what would
happen if a firm did not pay the required $4 for each ton above its quota. Our working assumption is that implicit in any collusive agreement is that egregious behavior—not making the requisite payment, incredible sales reports, and the like—risks
causing the cartel to collapse.
Theorem 1 provides sufficient conditions whereby the lysine strategy profile is a
semipublic perfect equilibrium, which is a sequential equilibrium satisfying certain
properties. Defined and used in Compte (1998), this solution concept requires that
equilibrium actions depend only on the public history, and messages depend only on

2434
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the public history and the most recent private history.12 In our setting, this means that
prices and payments depend only on the public history of past reports and payments,
while a firm’s report depends only on the public history of reports and payments and
the private information composed of the firm’s price and sales in the current period.13
Given a condition on the volatility of market demand, Theorem 1 shows that collusive outcomes are sustainable when firms are sufficiently patient. More specifically,
if firms are sufficiently patient and condition (1) in Theorem 1 holds, then a collusive
 is supportable using the lysine strategy profile and, in addition, the probability
price  p
of transiting to the noncollusive phase is arbitrarily small. In interpreting (1), recall
_
that m
 is the maximal value of market demand and μ is average market demand. As
−1
−1
 ) is the
p  N  (⋅) is the inverse of the static Nash equilibrium price function, then p   N  (  p


marginal cost for which the static Nash equilibrium price equals  p. Since  p> p N (c),
−1
 ) − c > 0. If ρ(⋅) puts sufficient mass on maximal demand so that averthen p  N  (  p
age demand is close to maximal demand, then (1) will hold.14 Thus, Theorem 1
shows that if demand is not “too stochastic”—in the restricted sense that average
demand is not too much lower than maximal demand—then collusion can be sustained when firms are sufficiently patient. The proof of Theorem 1 is in the Appendix.
 > pNand ε > 0, there exists _δ< 1 such that if δ > _δand
Theorem 1: For any p

 ) − c]
(n − 1)[ p N  (  p
μ
_
(1)	 _
   
  
  >  __
  ,
N
 − μ
m
 − p 
  p
−1

then the lysine strategy profile is a semipublic perfect equilibrium and
_

m
m  } < ε.
max {ϕ(m) : 
_ ≤ m ≤ 
If we impose the additional structure on demand to deliver p N (c) = c + const
(namely, that consumers have quasi-linear preferences in money), then (1) takes a
more easy-to-interpret form:
μ
_
  > n − 1.
(2)	 _
 − μ
m
In that case, Theorem 1 can be restated as:
_

Corollary 2: Suppose pN(c) = c + const. If μ/(m− μ) > n − 1, then for
 > pN and ε > 0, there exists _δ< 1 such that if δ > δ_then the lysine strategy
any  p
_
profile is a semipublic perfect equilibrium with max {ϕ(m) : 
m≤ m ≤ m  } < ε.
_
12

To be more exact, messages depend on the private history since the last period in which messages were informative. Compte (1998) considered equilibria in which there was delay in the sending of informative messages. In
the equilibrium we characterize, there is no delay.
13
Agreements consisting of reports and transfers after every period are also a feature of relational contracts as in
Levin (2003) where, as here, tractability is enhanced by using monetary transfers in place of continuation payoffs
to provide incentives. For a further comparative discussion of our paper and Levin (2003), see the online Appendix
Section 2.1.
_
14
Given that the left-hand side of (1) is unbounded as μ → m and the right-hand side is bounded, then (1) is
satisfied.
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Given firms truthfully report their sales, the mechanism used to sustain a collusive
price is the same as in Harrington and Skrzypacz (2007). For each unit that a firm
sells (and reports), it makes a payment of z to the other cartel members. Thus, when
a firm sells a unit rather than have the unit sold by another firm, it ends up paying
z rather than receiving z/(n − 1), so the net effect is (n/(n − 1))z. This means that
a firm’s effective marginal cost is c + (n/(n − 1))z. As a firm’s price affects only
its current profit and its net transfer—but not its future payoff—the equilibrium
(collusive) price is simply the static Nash equilibrium price when each firm faces a
marginal cost of c + (n/(n − 1))z. A higher collusive price can then be sustained by
setting a higher per unit transfer.
The preceding argument rests on a firm truthfully reporting its sales, and there
is clearly an incentive to underreport, since doing so reduces the required payment
to other firms. The collusive mechanism offsets this temptation to underreport by
making it more likely that the cartel breaks down when the aggregate sales report is
smaller.15 Specifically, we use the following specification in the proof of Theorem 1:
(3)

{

_

β (m − m)(1 − δ)

ϕ(m) =
		
(1 − δ)ω
where ω ∈ (0, 1) and16
(4)

_

if m ≤ 
m
_

if m > m	 ,

 ) − c]
(n − 1)[ p N   (  p
β ≥  ____
    
     
.
−1
_
N
 − p (c)) − (n − 1)[ pN   (  p
 ) − c ](m − μ)}
δ{ μ(  p
−1

This probability of cartel breakdown (see Figure 1) is decreasing and linear for
equilibrium values of the aggregate sales report. Thus, underreporting is discouraged
because a lower sales report is more likely to cause collusion to end. In counteracting the incentive to underreport, however, one could create an incentive to overreport; a firm reports higher sales and makes a higher payment in order to reduce
the likelihood of cartel collapse. Here, we use the fact that an overreport results in
reported market sales taking on, with positive probability, a nonequilibrium value
_
(that is, in excess of maximal demand m
 ). While the probability of a price war is
decreasing in total reported sales for equilibrium values of total demand, the probability of a price war is higher when total reported sales exceeds maximal demand
(at least, when δ → 1). Firms then do not want to overreport sales either.17 Finally,
as a positive probability of collusion ending is needed to induce firms to truthfully
report their sales, there is an inefficiency. While the probability of cartel breakdown
goes to zero as δ → 1, the inefficiency is bounded above zero.
15

While we have specified a punishment of infinite reversion to the stage game Nash equilibrium, this collusive
mechanism will also work with finite reversion, in which case there are periodic price wars.
16
Note that the lower bound on β in (4) is bounded with respect to δ, which means we can ensure ϕ(m) < 1 as
δ → 1.
17
In some situations, overreporting may be deterred by requiring invoices for reported sales or a customer list
which could then be contacted. There is no analogous verification process to detect underreporting because a firm
could withhold invoices or deliver a subset of its true customer list. In other words, evidence can be provided to
prove that a sale was made, but it is not possible to provide evidence that a sale wasn’t made. This discussion suggests that the challenge is to provide incentives to discourage underreporting.

2436

October 2011

THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW

Probability
1

(

ϕ ∑ j=1 rj

_
m

0
0

1

2

n

− 1

)

_ _
m m+

∑ j=1 rj
n

1

Figure 1

To explain the source of the restriction in (1), we need to examine the following
incentive compatibility constraint (ICC):
(5)

_


m

p)[ϕ(m − 1) − ϕ(m)] ≥ z.
δ(V − V    ) ∑  σ1(m | q, _
N

m=_
m

This ICC ensures it is better to report truthfully than to underreport by one unit.
Underreporting by one unit reduces firm 1’s payment to other firms by z, which is
the right-hand side of (5). The left-hand side is the expected reduction in the future
payoff from reporting q − 1 rather than q. The probability of cartel breakdown is
increased by ϕ(m − 1) − ϕ(m) (when the market demand realization is m) and the
foregone future payoff due to cartel breakdown is V − V  N, where V is the collusive
value and V  N is the noncollusive value. In the proof of Theorem 1, it is shown that
(5) is the binding ICC and is the source of (1).18
To show how (1) implies (5), first note that

(

 = pN  c +
	 p

n
n − 1
_
  z ⇔ z = (
(_
)[ p
n 
n − 1) )

 ) − c ],
(  p

N  −1

18
It is established in the proof of Theorem 1 that, when ϕ is weakly convex, if it is not optimal to underreport by
one unit, then it is not optimal to underreport by any amount. Also, given (3), (5) is the same regardless of (q, p_).
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in which case (1) is equivalent to

 − pN (c)](μ / n)
[  p
_
(6)	 __
  
m − μ.
> 
z 
Since
 − pN(c)](μ/n)
[  p
_
V − VN =  ___
   
   
  ,

m
1 − δ + δ ∑ m=_m ρ(m)ϕ(m)

(7)

the foregone loss from cartel breakdown is increasing in the
  , and
_ collusive price p

m
 is
is decreasing in the probability of cartel breakdown, ∑ m=_m ρ(m)ϕ(m). As  p
increasing in the per unit transfer z, this argues for a higher value of z in order to
 − pN(c)](μ/n). At the
raise the average gain in profit from maintaining collusion, [  p
same time, z is the savings in the payment that a firm has to make when it underreports by one unit, in which case higher z also increases the incentive to underreport.
 − p N (c)](μ/n) is large enough relative to z, which is
What is then needed is that [  p
19
what (6) requires. A second key factor determining the size of V − V  Nis the probability of cartel breakdown, which is the expression
(8)

_


m

_

m=_
m

m=_
m


m

_

_

	∑  ρ(m)ϕ(m) =  
∑  ρ(m)β(m − m)(1 − δ) = β(m − μ)(1 − δ).
_

 −μ
For V − V  Nto be large, (8) needs to be small and, therefore, (5) holds. Hence, m
must be small enough, as expressed in (6). In sum, sustaining collusion requires
that: (i) the rise in the collusive price from a per unit transfer is sufficiently large
relative to the size of the per unit transfer; and (ii) the likelihood of low demand is
sufficiently small so that cartel breakdown is not too likely.
To get some sense of the plausibility of the demand restriction in Theorem 1,
consider when the static Nash equilibrium price is c + const, so the restriction takes
_
the form in (2). Next suppose market sales is uniformly distributed on { m
_, … , m  }.
_
Since then μ = (m
_+ m)/2, (2) is
_

_
(m
m)/2
_ + 
n    >  _
m  .
__
	   
  
   > n − 1 ⇒  _
_
_
m
_
n − 2
 − (_
m
m + m)/2

With uniformly distributed market demand, the condition is that the ratio of the
upper bound to the lower bound of market sales is less than n/(n − 2). If n = 2, this
condition is satisfied as long as _
m
 > 0. If n = 3 (4), then it is satisfied if the upper
bound of market demand is no more than thrice (twice) the lower bound. For many
markets in which cartels have been observed, these bounds are quite reasonable. Most
cartels involve commodities and the demand for such goods is unlikely to be volatile
in terms of unanticipated variation. While demand may significantly change because
19
 − pN(c) = (n/(n − 1))z and, therefore, z cancels out
When p N(c) = c + const, as in Corollary 2, then  p
in (6).
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of the business cycle or trends in growth, that variation is largely anticipated and can
be controlled when it comes to monitoring. The fluctuation in market demand that we
are modelling is unanticipated variation, which is probably not large. All this suggests
that it is quite plausible that the demand condition required for the lysine strategy profile to be an equilibrium will hold in markets prone to cartels.
Finally, let us show that, as the discount factor goes to one, supracompetitive
profits can be sustained using the lysine strategy profile. Rescaling by 1 − δ, the
normalized supracompetitive payoff is (1 − δ)(V − V N ) . Substituting the minimum
value of β from (4), we derive
_

 − pN (c)) − nz(m − μ)].
(1 − δ)(V − V N ) = (1/n)[ μ(p

Thus, (1 − δ)(V − V  N) > 0 if and only if

_

 − pN(c)] − nz(m − μ) > 0,
μ[  p

which holds by (6). In sum, we have shown that, when prices and quantities are private information, firms can effectively sustain collusion using the type of practices
observed by recent cartels in the markets for citric acid, lysine, and vitamins.20
IV. Limitations of the Analysis and Future Research Directions

In this section we discuss some limitations to our model and equilibrium with
the purpose of assessing the robustness of our results and identifying areas for
future research.
• An assumption in our model is that market demand, while stochastic, does
not depend on firms’ prices; a firm’s price influences only its market share.
How restrictive is this assumption and how robust are our results to it?
The key implication of assuming that market demand is independent of price is
that total sales is not a signal of firms’ prices. If demand is price-elastic there may
exist equilibria that rely on it and achieve higher profits than the lysine strategy
profile, but we conjecture that the lysine strategy profile will still be an equilibrium.
While the equilibrium condition on price is more complicated (as now a firm’s price
affects market size) and will result in different prices, it will still be determined by
the static Nash equilibrium for a modified stage game.
It is also relevant to note that the independence of transfers to total sales is consistent with collusive practice, as cartels generally monitored compliance using market
20

Let us return to the assumption that firms must set uniform prices. A possible implication from allowing firms
to set customer-specific prices (that is, a different price for each unit of market demand) is that a firm could cheat
by lowering prices for only a subset of customers which, in principle, could make detection more difficult. This
deviation option does not, however, affect the lysine strategy profile because prices are set according to a static Nash
equilibrium; there is no incentive to deviate in price. The binding incentive compatibility constraints are for reports
and transfers, and those are unaffected by customer-specific pricing. In fact, Harrington and Skrzypacz (2007)
explicitly allowed for consumer-specific prices. They consider the same model as here—except that sales are public
information—and the same type of strategy profile on prices and transfers. Results were shown to be the same for
uniform and customer-specific prices.
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shares, not total sales (though a possible exception is when quotas were in terms of
volume rather than market share, in which case total sales indirectly mattered). One
of the reasons market sales was generally not used by the cartels to monitor prices
might be that the market demand was, in fact, highly inelastic, in which case market
sales was relatively uninformative. This seems plausible for many of the markets
we described in the introduction. Consider the markets for lysine and citric acid.
These products are being purchased by other firms as inputs; for example, lysine
is mixed with animal feed in the food processing industry. As they make up a very
small fraction of the unit cost of the purchaser’s product, their demand is likely to be
insensitive to price for a wide range of prices. Of course, the cartel members could
set price high enough to induce a nonnegligible fall in market demand, but the size
of the price increase required to make that happen may be of such a magnitude to
create suspicions among buyers that the input suppliers are colluding. Hence, over
the relevant range of prices, market demand is highly inelastic. An important caveat,
however, is when the cartel is not all-inclusive. If a nontrivial set of firms is outside of the cartel (such as the Chinese manufacturers in the market for vitamin C),
then total cartel supply will be sensitive to a cartel member’s price, even if market
demand is perfectly inelastic, in which case total cartel supply can be informative as
to cartel members’ prices.
• For the lysine strategy profile to be an equilibrium, it was required that average demand is sufficiently close to maximal demand (condition (1)). Can
collusion be sustained without this demand restriction being satisfied?
It may be possible to construct collusive equilibria even if demand condition (1) does not hold, though it is likely to involve a strategy distinct from
the lysine strategy. Pertinent to this issue, two examples are presented in the
online Appendix. In the first example, the lower bound to market demand, _
m, is
strictly positive and even; sufficient probability mass is assigned to m = _
m; and
_
the upper bound to market demand, m
 , is high enough to violate (1). For when
there is a duopoly, a collusive scheme is constructed with each firm having a
quota of m
 /2, which means that a firm that reports sales smaller than its quota
_
is given a side payment by the other firm proportional to the shortfall. The way
the scheme curtails incentives to underreport sales is by using punishments off
the equilibrium path when the sum of reports falls short of _
m. Its efficiency then
relies critically on the lower bound to total sales. In comparison with the lysine
strategy, it does not need value burning on the equilibrium path and it does not
_
rely on knowing m
 , as punishments are not required when reports are too high. A
final interesting feature is that it is based on quantity quotas rather than market
share quotas.
The second example we present in the online Appendix involves the simple case
when m ∈ {0, 1, 2 }. A mechanism design approach delivers an upper bound on payoffs for the set of symmetric semipublic equilibria in which firms report sales without delay. We further show that this upper bound is implementable by equilibria in
the dynamic game when players are sufficiently patient. Condition (1) is found to be
tight for semipublic perfect equilibria without delay. Namely, if ρ(0) is sufficiently
high—so that (1) is violated—then no collusion can be sustained (with semipublic
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equilibria without delay); and if ρ(2) is sufficiently high—so that (1) is satisfied—
collusion is possible.
Overall, our intuition is that in any collusive scheme the cartel has to resolve two
incentive problems: underpricing and underreporting. To resolve underpricing we
think that it is necessary to involve transfers as a function of reported sales, at least
if ψi is smooth (that intuition is based on the results in Harrington and Skrzypacz
2007). Since transfers depending on reported sales create incentives to misreport
sales, our conjecture is that to prevent underreporting it is necessary in any collusive
scheme to trigger punishment if the sum of reports is too small. In some cases (like
in our first example above), such punishments can be restricted to off the equilbrium
path; in other cases (as with our second example), they need to happen on the equilibrium path.21 If that value destruction happens too often, collusion will generate
too little value and sustaining high prices will not be possible. Hence, for some probability distributions on market demand, it may not be possible to sustain any collusion with semipublic equilibria and reports every period (as our second example in
the online Appendix illustrates).
• Our model assumed that the only source of information on other firms’ sales
were the self-reported numbers by those firms. Some cartels, however, received
external verification of sales from outside auditors. How does the availability of
other sources of information on sales affect the structure of equilibrium?
In some cartels, firms did attempt to independently verify sales. The most extreme
form of verification was to hire independent auditors to investigate the accuracy
of sales reported by a firm to the cartel (auditors from Switzerland were popular).
While such independent verification did occur, it was not typical. For example, we are
unaware of any documented usage of an independent auditor in a domestic US cartel.
It is important to recognize that, even when outside auditors are used, they provide a
noisy signal of sales because a cartel member can attempt to hide sales from auditors.
The use of auditors and the strategic hiding of sales were both present in the lysine cartel (see Harrington 2006). An area for future research is to characterize the properties
of equilibrium when cartel members make sales reports and receive noisy signals of
sales. As the binding incentive compatibility constraints for the lysine strategy profile
are those for the reporting stage (rather than the price and transfer stages), loosening
those constraints through additional information on sales could produce more effective
collusion. That much seems obvious. What is less obvious is the form of the collusive
mechanism when there are both self-reported sales and independent signals of sales.
• In our equilibrium, the frequency of sales realizations, sales reports, and
transfers were identical. It was quite common, however, for a cartel to have
sales reports that were less frequent than sales realizations and for transfers
to be less frequent than sales reports. Is the lysine strategy profile robust to
this modification? Why would a cartel not choose to have the timing of sales
realizations, sales reports, and transfers coincide?
21
When m ∈ {0, 1}, one can show that this conjecture is correct for any (even asymmetric) pure strategy semipublic equilibrium with reports every period.
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We believe our equilibrium is robust to these modifications. First, consider delay
in making transfers. When it chooses its price or sales report, a firm may now have
accumulated transfers (from sales reports since the last transfers were made). But
since it expects to pay those transfers in the future, its incentive for setting price and
truthfully reporting sales in the current period is influenced only by the change in
the accumulated transfer wrought by the current price and sales report. Both of those
incentive compatibility constraints are then altered only by the fact that the transfer
needs to be discounted. Finally, the incentive compatibility constraint for transfers
is assured of holding because that involves perfect monitoring, and thus is satisfied
as long as firms are sufficiently patient, regardless of how often transfers are made.
Next, turn to when sales reports are less frequent. Suppose that sales are realized
each period but firms exchange sales report and make transfers every τ periods. It
can be shown that Theorem 1 still holds, but where (1) is replaced with
μ
_
  >
	 _
 − μ
m

(

)(

)

 ) − c] _
(n − 1)[ pN  ( p
δ  τ − δ  τ+1
 
__
   
  
 
N
τ+1  .
 p − p (c)
δ − δ   
−1

With reports occurring every τ periods, the collusive value is different because collusion is assured for τ periods as a result of the public randomization device occurring
only after reports are made. Price is still set according to a static Nash equilibrium
condition, although it is complicated by the fact that transfers occur only every τ
periods, which affects the virtual marginal cost that a firm faces.
While our equilibrium is robust to delayed sales reports and transfers, this leaves
open the more important question of why firms did choose to delay sales reports and
transfers. If larger transfers make detection by the antitrust authority more likely,
then firms may want to intertemporally aggregate transfers on the hope that net
transfers will be smaller. There is also a body of work that suggests that information
delay can be useful for achieving more efficient equilibria—see, for example, Dilip
Abreu, Paul Milgrom, and David Pearce (1991), Compte (1998), and Kandori and
Matsushima (1998). In the online Appendix, we have an example in which, when
the lower bound to market demand is zero, all equilibria involve value destruction
(that is, a price war occurs with positive probability), and another example in which
the lower bound to market demand is positive and there is an equilibrium without
value destruction. If value destruction can be avoided when the lower bound to market sales is high enough, then this could be a rationale for delaying the reporting of
sales. More attention needs to be given to the role of delay in our setting.
V. Concluding Remarks

As it has been understood for a long time, monitoring of a collusive agreement is
essential to its success. Only if firms can expect noncompliance to be observed and
punished will cartel members abide by the agreement to maintain high prices and limit
supply. In spite of the critical role of monitoring, there are many well-documented episodes of successful collusion in markets for which there is limited public information
to use for the purposes of monitoring compliance. In environments for which prices
and sales are private information, it was frequently observed that collusion involved a
similar set of practices: firms self-report sales and conduct inter-firm transfers based
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on those reports; specifically, firms with high sales compensate those firms with low
sales. The main contribution of this paper is to show how those practices can result in
successful collusion in this informationally scarce environment. To induce firms to set
a collusive price, the equilibrium strategy has a firm make a payment to the other firms
for each unit that it reports having sold. To induce truthful reporting of sales, the probability of cartel breakdown—reversion to a stage game Nash equilibrium—is specified
to be higher when total reported market sales are lower. Thus, a firm that underreports
its sales realizes a benefit by having to make a lower payment to the other firms, but
also incurs a cost by increasing the probability that collusion breaks down. In equilibrium, the cost of the increased likelihood of cartel breakdown exceeds the benefit from
reduced interfirm payments, so that a firm finds it optimal to truthfully report its sales.
When the market involves intermediate goods—so that customers are industrial
buyers and thus price is private information between a buyer and a seller—our theory
suggests what antitrust authorities should look for in terms of collusive practices and
outcomes. First, they should look for firms exchanging sales reports. While this can
occur in secret, it can also occur through a trade association. Second, interfirm sales
or other forms of compensation, as the use of asymmetric punishments is essential
to effective collusion (a point originally made by Harrington and Skrzypacz 2007).
Third, periodic price wars, as it is the possible threat of a price war that induces firms
to truthfully report their sales. Thus, information exchange, interfirm transfers, and
periodic price wars all add up to potential indicators of collusion.
Appendix: Proof of Theorem 1
In proving that the lysine strategy profile is a semipublic perfect equilibrium, we
need to establish: (i) given any history of reports and payments, the prescribed price
is optimal; (ii) given any history of reports and payments and, for the current period,
a firm’s price and sales, the prescribed report is optimal; and (iii) given any history
of reports and payments (including the sales reports of firms in the current period),
the prescribed payment is optimal. We will tackle them in that sequence with the
bulk of the analysis concerning the incentive compatibility of sales reports, which
is step (ii). When the public history has one or more firms not submitting reports
or one or more firms not making payments, the optimality of behavior is obvious
because the industry is in the noncollusive phase. Our attention will then focus on
public histories on the equilibrium path, which means firms are in the collusive
phase and all firms submitted reports and made the appropriate payments.
By symmetry, let us restrict the analysis to firm 1. Given a generic price vector

and
the anticipation that truthful reports will be submitted and transfers will be
p
_
made, firm 1’s payoff at the price stage is
_


m

m

m=_
m

q=0

(9)	
∑  ρ(m)∑
  ψ1 (q; m, _
p)
 	

{[

(

)

]

m − q
(p1  − c)q + z _  − zq
n − 1

}

+ ϕ(m)δVN + (1 − ϕ(m))δV .

V is the value when in the collusive phase and V
   Nis the value when in the noncollusive phase. Note that a firm with sales q expects to pay zq, while receiving an
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equal share of the payments made by the other n − 1 firms which equal z(m − q).
Simplifying this expression, we derive
_


m

n
  z q
(_
n − 1) )
μ
_
  .
 ρ(m)[ϕ(m)δV   + (1 − ϕ(m))δV ] + z (
n − 1)
m

(

p) p1  − c −
∑  ρ(m) ∑  ψ1 (q; m, _
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q=0

+ 
∑ m=_m

N

Thus, if the collusive price is p
  then the ICC at the price stage is
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1

 is the static Nash
(10) is satisfied if and only if p
  = p  N(c + (n/(n − 1))z); that is,  p
equilibrium when unit cost is c + (n/(n − 1))z. For any z, we will then assume
 = p  N( c + (n/(n − 1))z). Since p  N( c + (n/(n − 1))z) is continuously increas p
ing and unbounded in z by A4, then for any p > p  N there exists z > 0 such that
p = p  N( c + (n/(n − 1))z).
Taking account of the fact that transfers average out to zero, expected collusive
profit is
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μ
n
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The collusive value is recursively defined by
_

m


V =  π (z) + ∑  ρ(m)[ϕ(m)δV   N + (1 − ϕ(m))δV ].
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The incremental gain from being in the collusive phase is
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Solving for V − V N,
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 π (z) −  π (0)
_
V − V N =  ___
  
   
 

m
1 − δ + δ ∑ m=_m  ρ(m)ϕ(m)

[(

(

))

]

n
 p N  c + _  z − p   N(c) (μ/n)
n − 1
_
    
    
 
.
=  ___

m
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This expression will be useful later in the proof.
The next step is to consider the optimality of a firm’s strategy at the report stage.
If in the collusive phase, then firm 1’s beliefs put unit mass on other firms setting a
price equal to p
  . Firm 1’s strategy is sequentially rational if the prescribed report is
 , any arbitrary price for firm
optimal given the other firms’ current period price was  p
1, and any feasible level of realized sales for firm 1, which is denoted q 1.22
Recall that σ
 1(m | q1, _
p) denotes firm 1’s posterior beliefs on total demand conditional on its quantity and the price vector. Given the other firms are expected to provide a truthful report and make payments, firm 1’s expected payoff from reporting
r1 (when its true sales is q 1) is23

{[

_

m

(

]
}

)

z
W (r1; q1, p1) = ∑  σ1(m | q1,_
p) ( p1 − c)q1 + _ (m − q1 − (n − 1)r1)
n
−
1
m=m
_

+ ϕ(m − q1 + r1)δV N  + (1 − ϕ(m − q1 + r1))δV .

The ICCs are
(12)

_

W(q1; q1, p1) ≥ W(r1; q1,, p1) ∀ r1 ∈ {0, 1, … }, ∀ q1 ∈ {0, 1, … q  }, ∀ p1.

These ICCs ensure that, for any price set by firm 1 and any realized sales for firm 1,
firm 1 finds it optimal to truthfully report its sales. That statement presumes that
firm 1 will make a payment of zr1regardless of what r1is, which we will later show
to be optimal.
Our analysis proceeds through several steps. First, we derive a condition ensuring that it is not optimal to overreport sales; that is, r1  = q1is preferred to any
r1  > q1. In deriving a condition ensuring that it is not optimal to underreport—that
is, r 1  = q1is preferred to any r 1  < q1—we first derive a condition whereby if it
is not optimal to underreport by one unit then it is not optimal to underreport by
any amount. Then we derive a condition whereby if it is not optimal to underre_
port by one unit when q 1  = q (so a firm’s sales are at its maximum level), then it
_
is not optimal to underreport by one unit when q 1  < q. We are then left with the
property: if
(13)

_ _

_

_

W(q; q, p1) ≥ W(q − 1; q, p1), ∀ p1 ,

then all underreporting ICCs at the report stage are satisfied. Theorem 1 is derived
by examining (13) as δ → 1. As we’ll see, its satisfaction requires imposing certain
properties on ϕ.
22

These conditions are sufficient but not necessary for semiperfect public equilibrium. It is possible there is a
deviant price, after which reporting truthfully is not a best response, but that deviant price (along with the optimal
report) is less profitable than setting the collusive price and reporting truthfully.
23
Though semipublic perfect equilibrium requires only that the ICC holds when other firms are believed to price
 , we will allow for any price vector in order to reduce the amount of notation.
at  p
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Let us start by deriving a condition that ensures that firm 1 prefers to provide a
truthful sales report to overreporting sales. The ICC is

{[

z
  (m − nq)]
(_
n − 1)
+ ϕ(m)δV   + (1 − ϕ(m))δV}
z
  (m − q  − (n − 1)r)]
≥ 
∑  σ(m | q,  p){[(p  − c)q  + (_
n − 1)
+ ϕ(m − q  + r)δV   + (1 − ϕ(m − q  + r))δV} , ∀ r > q.
_


m

∑  σ(m | q1, _p) ( p1  − c)q1  +
(14)	
m=_
m

1

N

_


m

m=_
m

1

_

1

1

1

1

1

1

N

1

1

1

1

After some manipulations, we have
(15)

_


m

δ(V − VN  ) ∑  σ1(m | q1, _
p)[ϕ(m − q1  + r1) − ϕ(m)] ≥ z(q1  − r1).
m=_
m

Interpreting (15), the right-hand side is the change in transfer from reporting r1
instead of q 1. As z > 0 and r 1  > q1, it is negative. The left-hand side is the expected
change in the future payoff due to overreporting. It captures the impact of an overreport on the probability of transiting to the noncollusive phase. Equilibrium requires
that the change in the expected future payoff is at least as great as the reduction in
the current payoff from making a higher payment. As the right-hand side of (15) is
negative, a sufficient condition for (15) to hold is then
(16)

_


m

p)[ϕ(m − q1  + r1) − ϕ(m)] ≥ 0.
δ(V − VN  )∑  σ1(m | q1, _
m=_
m

We will return to this condition later in the proof.
Next, consider the case of underreporting. The ICCs are
W(q1; q1, p1) ≥ W(r1; q1, p1) ∀ r1 ∈ {0, 1, … , q1 − 1},

(17)

_

∀ q1 ∈ {0, 1, … q  }, ∀ p1.
Given q1, reporting r1is preferred to r 1  − 1, where r 1  ≤ q1, if and only if
(18)

_

m

{[

_

m

m=m
_

)

]

{[

}

+ ϕ(m − q1 + r1)δVN + (1 − ϕ(m − q1 + r1))δV

≥ ∑  σ1(m | q1,_
p ) (p1 − c)q1 +
m=m
_

(

z
∑  σ1(m | q1,_
p) (p1 − c)q1 + _ (m − q1 − (n − 1)r1)
n − 1

z
 (m − q − (n − 1)(r − 1))]
(_
n − 1)
1

1

}

+ ϕ(m − q1 + r1 − 1)δVN + (1 − ϕ(m − q1 + r1 − 1))δV .
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Performing some manipulations, we derive
_


m

(19)	
∑  σ1(m | q1, p_)[ϕ(m − q1  + r1  − 1) − ϕ(m − q1  + r1)]
m=_
m

× δ(V − V  N) ≥ z.

By underreporting by one unit, firm 1 reduces its payment by z, which is the righthand side of (19). The left-hand side is the expected change in the future payoff
from underreporting.
What we want to show is that if (19) holds for r1  = q1, then it holds ∀r1  < q1, and
_
this is true for q1  ≤ q. This is indeed the case if
ϕ(m − q1  + r1  − 1) − ϕ(m − q1  + r1)
_

is nonincreasing in r 1 ∀ r1  ≤ q1, ∀ q1  ≤ q; or, equivalently, ϕ(m − 1) − ϕ(m) is non_
increasing in m ∀ m ≤ m. From hereon, this property is assumed for ϕ.
Having derived a sufficient condition on ϕ whereby if a firm doesn’t want to
underreport by one unit then it doesn’t want to underreport by any amount, the next
step is to derive a sufficient condition such that if it is not optimal to underreport
by one unit given q1  = q′, then it is not optimal to underreport by one unit given
q1  = q′ − 1. Using the explicit expressions, W(q′; q′, p1) ≥ W(q′ − 1; q′, p1) takes
the form
_


m

z
∑  σ1 (m | q′, _p)[ϕ(m − 1) − ϕ(m)] ≥  _
   .
(20)	
m=_
m
δ(V − V N )

What we want to show is that if (20) holds, then (21) holds:
_


m

z
(21)	
∑  σ1 (m | q′ − 1, _p)[ϕ(m − 1) − ϕ(m)] ≥  _
  
.
m=_
m
δ(V − V  N)

This is the case if and only if the left-hand side of (21) is at least as great as the lefthand side of (20):
_


m

∑  σ1(m | q′ − 1, _p)[ϕ(m − 1) − ϕ(m)]
(22)	
m=_
m

_


m

≥ ∑  σ1 (m | q′, _
p)[ϕ(m − 1) − ϕ(m)].
m=_
m

Since we’ve already assumed ϕ(m − 1) − ϕ(m) is nonincreasing in m, (22) holds if
p), which is true by A3.
σ(⋅ | q′, p
_  ) FOSD σ(⋅ | q′ − 1, _
_
To summarize, if ϕ(m − 1) − ϕ(m) is nonincreasing in m ∀ m ≤ m, then (17)
_ _
_
_
holds if and only if W(q; q, p1) ≥ W(q− 1; q, p1) or
(23)

_

m


_

δ(V − V  )∑  σ1 (m | q, p
_)[ϕ(m − 1) − ϕ(m)] ≥ z.
N

m=_
m
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Substituting (11) into (23), we have
(24)

δ

(

)

_


m

 − pN (c)](μ/n)
[  p
_
__
_
  
   
 ∑  σ1(m | q, _
p)[ϕ(m

m
1 − δ + δ ∑ m=_m  ρ(m)ϕ(m) m=_
m

− 1) − ϕ(m)] ≥ z.

Summarizing the proof of Theorem 1 thus far, if the ICCs for the payment stage
are satisfied (which is shown later), then the lysine strategy profile is a semipublic
 = p N ( c + (n/(n − 1))z); (ii) ϕ(m − 1) − ϕ(m) is
perfect equilibrium when: (i)  p
_
nonincreasing in m ∀ m ≤ m; (iii) (16) holds; and (iv) (24) holds. We now want to
impose properties on ϕ so that (ii)–(iv) are satisfied as δ → 1.
Assume

{

_

β(m − m)(1 − δ)

(25)
ϕ(m) =
		
(1 − δ)ω

_

if m ≤ m
_

if m < m ,

where β > 0 and ω ∈ (0, 1); see Figure 1. With this specification, ϕ is decreasing in
_
_
_
m for m ≤ m, equals zero for m = m, and is positive and constant for m > m. Note
_
 (m) = 0 for m ≤ m, then the equilibrium
that (ii) is then satisfied. Since lim  δ→1ϕ
probability of a punishment goes to zero. As we will suppose δ → 1, ϕ(m) is assured
of lying in [ 0, 1), as long as β is bounded.
Inserting (25) into (24), we get

{

}

_

m


 − p  (c)](μ/n)
[  p
_
_
   
    
 ∑  σ1 (m | q, p
δ ___
_

m
_)β(1 − δ) ≥ z.
N

1 − δ + δ ∑ m=_m  ρ(m)β(m − m)(1 − δ)

m=_
m

Simplifying and rearranging it, this ICC holds if and only if
_
nz
 − p  N(c)) − nz(m − μ)] ≥  _
 .
β[ μ(p
δ

(26)
If

_

 − p  N(c)) > nz(m − μ),
μ(  p

(27)

then (26) is satisfied if β is sufficiently large. Let us show that (27) is equivalent
 = p  N(c + (n/(n − 1))z), we can solve for the per unit transfer z
to (1). Given  p
required to induce the collusive price p
  :

(

(28)	pN  c +
−1

n
n − 1
_
  z =  p  ⇔ z = (
(_
) [ p
n 
n − 1) )

 ) − c].
  (  p

N  −1

pN  exists by A4. Substituting (28) into (27) and rearranging gives us (1). In sum, if
(1) holds and ϕ satisfies (25)–(26), then all of the underreporting ICCs hold.
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This leaves us just having to show (iii). This we will do by showing that (16)
holds as δ → 1. Using (25) and assuming r1  > q1, the left-hand side of (16) is

{

_

 −(r1−q1)
m

(29) δ(V − V   )  ∑   σ1(m | q1, _
p)
N

m=_
m

_

_

× [ β(m − (m − q1  + r1))(1 − δ) − β(m − m)(1 − δ)]
_


m

{

+  
∑
_

}

_

 σ1(m | q1,_
  p)[(1 − δ)ω − β(m − m)(1 − δ)]

m=m−(r1−q1)+1

_

 −(r1−q1)
m

= δ(V − V  )   ∑   σ1(m | q1,_
  p)(q1  − r1)β(1 − δ)
N

m=_
m

_


m

+   
∑
_

}

_

 σ1(m | q1, _
p)[(1 − δ)ω − β(m − m)(1 − δ)] .

m=m−(r1−q1)+1

Using (11) and (25), we substitute for V − VNin (29),
(30)
 	

 

 − pN(c)](μ/n)
[  p
_
   
    
= δ ____
 
_

m
1 − δ + δ ∑ m=_m  ρ(m)β(m − m)(1 − δ)
×

{

_

 −(r1−q1)
m

   ∑   σ1(m | q1,_
  p)(q1  − r1)β
m=_
m

_


m

+   
∑
_

_

}

 σ1(m | q1, _
p)[(1 − δ )ω−1  − β(m − m)] .

m=m−(r1−q1)+1

Letting δ → 1, the first term in { ⋅ } is bounded, while the second term is unbounded
and positive, since ω − 1 < 0 implies lim  δ→1(1 − δ)ω−1  = + ∞. (It is here where we
use A2.) Hence, as δ → 1 then the expression in { ⋅ } is positive. Thus, (iii) holds as
δ → 1.
The final step in proving the lysine strategy profile is a semipublic perfect equilibrium is to show that the prescribed behavior for the payment stage is optimal.
First, note that reporting zero and following the equilibrium strategy (which entails
a zero payment) is at least as good as any positive sales report and not making
the corresponding payment; for the latter results in a punishment for sure while the
former could have a punishment with probability less than one. Since we’ve already
shown that reporting truthfully is weakly preferred to reporting zero and following
the equilibrium strategy (obviously, the two reports are identical when realized sales
is zero), it follows that a firm never finds it optimal to submit a report and then not
make the corresponding payment.24
24
It can also be shown that, if firms are sufficiently patient and reports are bounded, it is always optimal to pay
zr after reporting r. Since monitoring is perfect, the usual argument works.
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In sum, if (1) holds, then, by choosing δ sufficiently close to one, the lysine strategy profile is a semipublic perfect equilibrium. Finally, for any ε > 0, when δ is
sufficiently close to one,
_

_

m ≤ m ≤ 
m} = β (m − 
m)(1 − δ) < ε,
max {ϕ(m) : 
_
_
so the probability of a price war in any given period can be made arbitrarily small.
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